COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTHORITY: The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is required, under the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA02), to monitor, investigate and decide whether mergers may be expected to give rise to a

Data-sharing agreement from NHS Digital registers of approved data releases, 2014–2019. Evidence status: source reported.

Organisation: COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTHORITY
Source reference: DARS-NIC-32833-M3M9V-v2.6
Jurisdiction: England
Licence: Open Government Licence v3.0, subject to NHS England terms and exclusions

Register reference: DARS-NIC-32833-M3M9V-v2.6
Agreement period: not published to no end date published
For commercial purposes (as marked in the register): Not stated
Release files listed by NHS England: 15

Data approved

Hospital Episode Statistics Admitted Patient Care
Hospital Episode Statistics Outpatients
Hospital Episode Statistics Accident and Emergency

Objective, as published

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is required, under the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA02), to monitor, investigate and decide whether mergers may be expected to give rise to a substantial lessening of competition within any markets(s) in the UK for goods or services. If the CMA concludes that there is an anti-competitive outcome, it must decide whether action should be taken to remedy, mitigate, or prevent the identified substantial lessening of competition and/or any adverse effect which may be expected to result from the substantial lessening of competition. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA12) confirms this duty with respect to the merger of NHS Foundation Trusts. The CMA will be conducting reviews of several NHS Trust and Foundation Trust mergers across England. The reviews seek to establish whether the mergers may result in adverse effects for patients by reducing choice and competition. If borne out, such a reduction in competition could have the consequence of removing or dampening the incentives that currently exist for the Trusts to maintain and improve quality for patients, or to retain patients, given that the hospitals currently may seek to attract patient referrals from each other. The CMA's objective for processing data is to analyse the closeness of competition between the specific merging Trusts at trust and site level to specifically understand: - the geographic distribution of patients attending Trusts in the merging areas - the overlap in servi…

Expected benefits, as published

Economic literature suggests competition between healthcare providers strengthens incentives for hospitals to innovate, therefore maintaining and improving standards of quality. Following a merger between NHS (Foundation) Trusts, if there is a reduction of choice and competition, then this could have the consequence of reducing quality for patients by removing the incentives that currently exist for the Trusts to attract patient referrals from each other. The CMA must therefore finally decide whether the merger would result in a substantial lessening of competition. If a substantial lessening of competition is found, the CMA needs to consider whether it should take action for the purpose of remedying, mitigating or preventing the substantial lessening of competition concerned. For these p…

Source: https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/2019/https://digital.nhs.uk/binaries/content/assets/website-assets/service/dars/release-registers/releaseregister20180301_20180524.xlsx. Captured 2026-10-30.

Limitations: Agreement as recorded in an NHS Digital register of approved data releases (2014–2019), retrieved from the UK Government Web Archive. That register lists releases made in its period and the agreement's purpose statement as it then stood; it gives no agreement dates, and the agreement may have changed since. Imported only where a paper quotes a reference no current register holds.