THE UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER: The purpose of this application is to obtain data to be used in specific academic research projects evaluating the impact of financial and organisational reforms of the English Nat

Data-sharing agreement from NHS Digital registers of approved data releases, 2014–2019. Evidence status: source reported.

Organisation: The University of Manchester
Source reference: DARS-NIC-317873-H3L1R-v1.9
Jurisdiction: England
Licence: Open Government Licence v3.0, subject to NHS England terms and exclusions

Register reference: DARS-NIC-317873-H3L1R-v1.9
Agreement period: not published to no end date published
For commercial purposes (as marked in the register): Not stated
Release files listed by NHS England: 9

Data approved

Hospital Episode Statistics Accident and Emergency
Hospital Episode Statistics Admitted Patient Care
Hospital Episode Statistics Outpatients

Objective, as published

The purpose of this application is to obtain data to be used in specific academic research projects evaluating the impact of financial and organisational reforms of the English National Health Service. Over the past 10 years, multiple reforms have aimed at creating incentives for performance improvements amongst providers, and higher quality of care for patients. The aim of this research is to assess the extent to which the structure and design of these reforms has led to the intended improvements in productivity and outcomes. The data will be used in regression analysis using advanced econometric modelling (including linear and non-linear regressions models, multilevel models and difference-in-differences designs) to generate causal inferences on the impact on health policy and service structure and design on health outcomes. The data will only be used for the following projects: Project 1: The effects of non-payment for performance Since 2011 the English National Health Service (NHS) has aimed at reducing readmission rates by not paying for individual readmissions occurring within 30 days of discharge from hospital (Department of Health, 2011). In a similar spirit, the “never events” policy framework withholds payment for hospitalisations leading to undesired patient outcomes e.g. pressure ulcers during hospitalisation and wrong side surgery. The objective of this project is to conduct academic research on the effect of the non-payment policies on patients’ health outcomes…

Expected benefits, as published

Please see the individual project descriptions for details. The results from the research projects described above are expected to be published by 2018 and will shed important new light on how the framing and design of organisational performance incentives affect the outcome of such reforms. In addition to its academic value, the research will thus inform policy makers on efficient design of health care service organisation and performance incentives and how to best allocate scarce health care resources in the English NHS for the benefit of patients. Project 1: The effects of non-payment for performance The non-payment policies analysed in this project represent a genuine novelty in the approach to incentivising higher quality care in the English NHS. Where previous initiatives to improve…

Source: https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/2019/http://content.digital.nhs.uk/media/24614/Release-Register-March---May-2017/xls/Release_Register__March_-_May_20171.xlsx. Captured 2026-10-30.

Limitations: Agreement as recorded in an NHS Digital register of approved data releases (2014–2019), retrieved from the UK Government Web Archive. That register lists releases made in its period and the agreement's purpose statement as it then stood; it gives no agreement dates, and the agreement may have changed since. Imported only where a paper quotes a reference no current register holds.